Contemporary Western society tends towards inducing us to observe attentive vigilance over our own bodies, encouraging the adoption of rigorous physical conditioning practices, the incorporation of proper diets and habits, along with the submission to constant medical monitoring in order to instill the self management of health. Diagnosis technologies are fulcral to these complex negotiations, since they provide objective images that help legitimating and specifying disease concepts accordingly to the unyielding dogma of visual objectivity in Western sciences and culture, as well as to the logic of risk and the imperative of prevention. Therefore, this paper aims to explore the extent to which biomedical representations of the body affects the constitution of contemporary identities. In particular, it focuses on the profound cultural impact brought up by the shift on how formerly considered ordinary behaviors were pronounced pathological conditions since the association between neuroimaging and neurobiology in the 1980's.
Introduction
When real infirmities fail us, knowledge lends us hers. Montaigne (Apology to Raymond Sebond,Essays, II) A loyal companion to the good old mind/body dualism, the belief in a correspondence between exteriority and interiority is not exactly foreign www.e-compos.org.br | E-ISSN 1808-2599 |
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On the one hand, though, biomedicine visual culture itself is deeply rooted in such assumptions. Vesalius's De Post Humani Corpori Fabrica (1543) founded not the corpse but its very double as the object of modern medicine (BRETON, 2003, p. 18) , and by turning the body into a book designed for experts in decoding its language, the Dutch anatomist made way for the idealization of a realistic representation of the body in medicine, as inherited by medical photography, which started being used by doctors back in the 1850's as a means to solve diagnostic impasses, and, a short while later, to capture the rampant invisible demons of madness.
Likewise, Roentgen's phantasmagorical rays were quickly credited by both spiritualists and the general public with the romantic ability to unveil the invisible realms of the heart and soul (CARTWRIGHT, 1997, p. 121) .
However, in the early 21 st century, through PET scans and MRI, many disorders are being ascribed to the physiology of the brain itself, regardless of experiences or subjectivity, therefore settling an organic, biological cause not only for big deals such as serial killing, but also for every possible plain ordinary misbehaving. The amygdala, for instance, emerged through these studies as the new core of human affections -which would depend on its high or low activation -and so as a key for explaining emotional behaviors and affective disorders 2 . Besides, it hardly could be considered overreacting to mention as well that it seems that neurobiology has a neurobiology for each one of the so far widely and fairly acceptable misdemeanours of everyday life, like smoking, feeling down once in a while, or simply daydreaming on math classes.
What is definitely worrisome is a disconcerting continuity between this specific trend in contemporary neurobiology and the modern sciences of man with the likes of Bertillon and Lombroso's criminal anthropology, for instance, whose goals were mainly screening for visual evidences in order to sort people out not only as ill or healthy, but also in other patently Benthamian dualities such as inoffensive/ dangerous, sane/insane, worthy/unworthy, and so on. This particular trend in neurobiology focuses on the proneness to certain behaviors, and even moral values, which allegedly could be detected or, in a near future -fortunately, in this case, like most biotechnologies, its promisses lay way ahead of its actual powers -rather predicted through brain scanning.
Therefore, this paper attempts to trace a brief genealogy of such correspondences in the history of brain sciences and the representation of the 1 Originally presented at the "Our Brains, Our Selves" Aarhus mirror workshop: historical and ethnographic approaches to the new brain sciences, Denmark, coordinated by Nikolas Rose (LSE/Bios-Center) and the University of Aarhus, and sponsored by ENSN (November, 2008) .
www.e-compos.org.br | E-ISSN 1808-2599 | body, a combination with an undeniable potential to pervade not only the courtroom, but all the spheres of life, especially through mediatization, due to the apparent validity and reliability it elicits regarding disorders diagnosis from the 1980's on. Enter the physiologist and moving images groundbreaker Etiénne-Jules Marey, who developed cronophotography, the method that allowed a dynamic and temporalized vision of the living body -Helmholtz's experimental physiology's own language par excellence (CARTWRIGHT, 1997, p. 11-13 The Photographer catches in a moment the permanent cloud, or the passing storm or sunshine of the soul, and thus enables the metaphysician to witness and trace out the connection between the visible and the invisible in one important branch of his researches into the Philosophy of the human mind (DIA-MOND apud PRODGER, 1998, p. 163 ).
A penny for your thoughts: peering into the brain
Assigned to the Salpêtrière in 1862, with the pedagogic purpose of organizing the largest asylum of France described in his own words as a "living museum of pathology", Jean-Martin Charcot began to devote himself to cataloguing the cases, and was appointed ten years later as professor of pathological anatomy. Since Didi-Huberman, a representation for theregion (DIDI-HUBERMAN, 2003, p. 21) . Therefore, as Alain Ehrenberg argues, Hystery is the pathology which allowed the construction of the idea of psychism besides providing it with a specific context other than a brain lesion. By then, a lesion was necessary to explain the ill in order to speak about the disease. Confronted by the vast problems of the connection between a lesion that is not found and a disconcerting symptomatology, the neurologist Charcot employs the notion of "functional" or "dynamic lesion". This allows him to consider hysteria as an authentic pathology, fitting it among the well known classes of sine materia diseases and constitutional diseases whose lesions experimental pathology was helpless to find […] Charcot shows that the discriminating sign of hysteria is its suggestibility by hypnosis, that produces a physiological responseand not a psychological one... Therefore, Charcot saves hystery's disease statute, solidly sheltering it, at least that's what he believes, within neurology's domain. This conception's disqualification, on the one hand, generates psychopathology and, on the other, restricts neurology's action range. Imaginary diseases are followed by diseases of the imagination, to which will be reserved the multiple psychotherapies invented then, as for instance, psychoanalysis... (EHREN-BERG, 2003, p. 4) Later, in 1882, while a wide range of medical efforts towards the insertion of light bulbs into the body cavities still took place (CARTWRIGHT, 1997, p. 113; REISER, 1978, p. 56; SIMON, 2005, 
Hence, Erhenberg argues,
When biologists (and not biology itself) assure they can prove that everything comes from interiority (including the social), they replace metaphysical interiority by a biological interiority: metaphysics assumes the semblance of a scientific matter (ERHENBERG, 2003, p. 14) 3 Brains 'r' Us Significant progress in forensic neuropsychiatry also has affected the practise of law, in which an understanding of the complex interplay among mind, brain, and behavior is becoming increasingly desirable and even necessary. Practitioners and scholars of criminal law in particular have taken an interest in neuroscientific developments within psychiatry, forensic psychiatry, and other behavioral sciences. With respect to forensic psychiatry, this trend is not surprising, given that many topics of rele-www.e-compos.org.br | E-ISSN 1808-2599 | vance to it, such as the neuropsychiatric basis of violent behavior, moral decision making, and the nature of empathyhave become the object of intensive study (SILVA, 2007, p. 6 ).
There is a clear tendency towards a classification of disorders accordingly to what Flechsig, Lombroso, Gall, Esquirol or Charcot would rather consider an organic pathology, hence attributed to a diagnosable, albeit imaginary, lesion, that is, to biology itself. For Erhenberg,
The era between the end of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century saw the establishment of a separation, founded on the clinic, between neurology's cerebral and psychopathology's speaking man. In the first case, the symptom transcends the patient who has a nervous system disease (the brain is the target of therapeutic imputation), in the second, the symptom is entirely singular to the patient who is sick of him or herself, so to speak, of his or her intentionality (desire, belief, will, and so forth). Since then, psychiatrists and neurologists often search for connections between both realms. Simultaneously, the distinction between lesion and function became the cause of controversies on the body/spirit (or brain/spirit) interactions (ERHENBERG, 2003, p. 5 ).
Conclusion
According to Paulo Vaz et al, in a cultural context dominated by the belief in a generalized virtuality of disease, biomedicine and media -associated by the ever present discourse on risk -cooperate to shape not only behaviors and life styles, but identities themselves (Vaz et al, 2006, p. 148-149) .
Throughout the twentieth century, due to the cultural impact of the advance and the ubiquitous mediatization of diagnosis technologies, as well as the huge improvement in therapeutics, biomedicine not only changed social perspectives regarding health and illness, but also influenced expectations, objectives and identities in numerous and significant aspects, as Rose singles out. Indeed, according to Rose, the language of biomedicine became second nature in Western culture and, consequently, people tend to regard themselves as "somatic" individuals, whose personhoods and bodily experience deeply relate to the medical vocabulary (ROSE, 2007, p. 25-26) .
For Nízia Villaça and Fred Góes (1998, p.142 is crucial both in the social sphere and the medical field, supposing, as Rosenberg remarks, a conceptual distinction between them. Therefore, a disease only comes to existence -as well as its bearers -as long as it is named (ROSENBERG, 1997, p. 305-310) .
Disease, thus, is not simply an abstract entity able to destabilize and deteriorate the physiological structure and its functions, whose experience is restricted to the interactions in the clinical, scientific and institutional environments of public health. Above all, disease absorbs specific characteristics from the cultural and historical contexts within which they are framed.
Disease -and therefore the notion of health -results from a framing process that engages the definition of disease and its influence on individual lives, public policies and the structure of health care services (Ibidem). Therefore, as
Rosenberg states,
Diagnosis is central to the definition and management of the social phenomenon that we call disease. It constitutes an in-dispensable point of articulation between the general and the particular, between agreed-upon knowledge and its application. It is a ritual that has always linked doctor and patient, the emotional and the cognitive, and, in doing so, has legitimated physicians' and the medical system authority while facilitating particular clinical decisions and providing culturally agreedupon meanings for individual experience (ROSENBERG, 2002, p. 240) .
Regarding disorders, whose definitions and classifications seem to be perhaps even more problematic and complex than the one of diseases, it is vital to mention the worldwide Anxiety Neurosis, for instance, was defined in opposition to "normal aprehension or fear" as an anxious over-concern, associated with somatic symptoms. According to Kutchins and Kirk, anxiety in general became a mental disorder, whereas neuroses were completely banished from the DSM-III in 1980, although the idea of anxiety was kept (KUTCHINS; KIRK, 1997, p. 24-25 (ROSE, 2007, p. 198-199; VENÂNCIO; RUSSO, 2006, p. 465) .
Since the first edition of DSM, the number of disorders multiplied in a frenzy, and along with several kinds of depression, for instance, one may find sleep disorders as well. It is also clear that disorders became regarded more like organic conditions that, unlike disease, are solely attributed to the individual's physiology and not to external factors, although the exposition to stressful situations is still mentioned. Therefore, being pathological never was as normal as in the 
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